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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1766 
_____________ 
  
DUNKIN’ DONUTS FRANCHISING LLC,  
a Delaware limited liability company;  
DUNKIN’ DONUTS FRANCHISED RESTAURANTS LLC,  
a Delaware limited liability company;  
DD IP HOLDER LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;  
BASKIN-ROBBINS FRANCHISING LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;  
BR IP HOLDER LLC, a Delaware limited liability company 
 
v. 
 
C3WAIN INC., a New Jersey corporation;  
CWAIN INC., a New Jersey corporation; 
MOOTHEDATH RAMACHANDRAN, JR.,  
a resident of the State of New Jersey 
 
               C3WAIN, INC. and Moothedath Ramachandran, 
 
                                            Appellants 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-13-cv-06865) 
District Judge: Hon. Peter G. Sheridan 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 20, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  February 3, 2017) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 C3WAIN, Inc. and Moothedath Ramachandran, Jr. (“Mr. Ramachandran,” and 
collectively, “Franchisees”) appeal from the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Dunkin’ Donuts Franchising LLC, Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised 
Restaurants LLC, DD IP Holder LLC, Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC, and BR IP 
Holder LLC (collectively, “Dunkin’”).  Because the record shows no genuine dispute as 
to the fact that Mr. Ramachandran violated the franchise agreement by misrepresenting 
his involvement in another business, the District Court did not err in granting summary 
judgment.  We will therefore affirm. 
I 
 Mr. Ramachandran is the sole shareholder of C3WAIN, which owns the lease and 
franchise rights for a store (the “Dunkin’ Donuts store”) that sells both Baskin-Robbins 
and Dunkin’ Donuts products in the Freehold Raceway Mall in New Jersey.  C3WAIN, 
by and through Mr. Ramachandran, entered a franchise agreement with Dunkin’.  The 
agreement stated that C3WAIN would “be in default” of the Agreement if its “owners 
commit a fraud upon [Dunkin’] . . . relating to a business franchised or licensed by 
[Dunkin’].”  App. 86 ¶¶ 14.0, 14.0.4.  If C3WAIN violated the fraud provision, the 
agreement gave Dunkin’ the right to terminate the entire franchise agreement.  
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Before he ever discussed opening the Dunkin’ Donuts store with the Mall’s 
agents, Mr. Ramachandran contacted the Mall’s leasing agent and informed her that his 
wife, Raji Ramachandran (“Mrs. Ramachandran”), sought to open a Red Mango Frozen 
Yogurt and Smoothies franchise store (the “Red Mango store”) in the Mall.  
While negotiating the Dunkin’ Donuts store lease with the Mall and the franchise 
agreement with Dunkin’, Mr. Ramachandran participated (along with Mrs. 
Ramachandran) in negotiations for the Red Mango store lease.  During these 
negotiations, Mr. Ramachandran sent an email to the leasing agent, copying several 
Dunkin’ employees, and characterizing the concept as a “‘Youthtopia’ Dunkin / Red 
Mango” that would have “a different look and feel” and would not be “a ‘run of the mill’ 
store.”  App. 168.  One of the Dunkin’ employees responded to Mr. Ramachandran and 
asked “[d]o you own any Red Mango stores currently?  You can not be approved to 
develop a Red Mango with Dunkin’ Donuts at the mall.”  App. 167.  Mr. Ramachandran 
replied “[n]o, I am not developing any Red Mango stores nor do I have [a] franchise 
agreement with them.”  App. 167.  A few days later, Mr. Ramachandran sent Dunkin’ an 
email stating: 
[P]lease be informed that I DO NOT HAVE A RED MANGO.  I am not a 
franchise of that company, own any stores, nor do I have an agreement to 
develop any stores for them.  They ([R]ed Mango) would be like any other 
store in the mall like a Star Bucks[sic], Gloria Jeans or the local bagel store.  
I have no financial interest in a Red Mango therefore, it is indeed not a 
factor to be concerned about. 
 
App. 171. 
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Mr. Ramachandran later sent an email to the Mall leasing agent that stated “[d]o 
not talk about [R]ed [M]ango with [a Dunkin’ employee].”  App. 297.  In reply, the lease 
agent asked “[d]oes he not know [R]ed [M]ango is going next door?”  App. 297.  Mr. 
Ramachandran then replied, “No . . . I don’t want him to cancel Dunkin,” App. 297 
(ellipsis in original), and separately told the leasing agent: “I don’t need to tell Dunkin 
what my wife does.  I am not an owner of Red Mango nor . . . am [I] the franchisee for 
Red Mango.  We are just splitting the space to make the economics work.”  App. 296. 
 Mr. and Mrs. Ramachandran eventually opened both stores next door to each other 
in the Mall.  Mrs. Ramachandran leased the Mall storefront and opened the Red Mango 
store through the corporate entity Greensphere Inc.,1 of which she is the sole shareholder.  
Both Mr. and Mrs. Ramachandran personally guaranteed Greensphere Inc.’s lease for the 
Red Mango storefront.  In the guarantor agreement, Mr. Ramachandran represented that 
he had a financial interest in the tenant, Greensphere Inc.  Additionally, before the stores 
opened, another corporate entity wholly owned by Mr. Ramachandran obtained a 
$250,000 bank loan.  Mr. Ramachandran used $100,000 of the loan for construction of 
the Dunkin’ Donuts store and transferred the remaining $150,000 to Greensphere Inc. as 
a loan for the construction of the Red Mango store. 
 Approximately a year after the parties executed the franchise agreement, Dunkin’ 
served a notice of default on Franchisees.  The notice stated that Franchisees breached the 
franchise agreement by, among other things, “commit[ing] fraud in connection with your 
                                              
 1 Mr. and Mrs. Ramachandran established Greensphere Inc. for the purpose of 
operating a recycling business, but it never conducted any recycling business.  
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franchises by: (1) intentionally misrepresenting your involvement with a competing 
business in order to induce Franchisor’s approval of your Freehold Raceway Mall 
Franchise, and (2) continuing to conceal from Franchisor your interest in a competing 
business.”  App. 174.  The notice informed Franchisees that Dunkin’ was terminating the 
agreement and demanded that Franchisees stop using Dunkin’ Donuts and Baskin-
Robbins proprietary marks.  Mr. Ramachandran refused and continued to operate the 
Dunkin’ Donuts store.   
 Dunkin’ then filed suit, alleging, among other things, breach of contract resulting 
from Mr. Ramachandran’s alleged fraud.  After discovery, Dunkin’ moved for summary 
judgment.  The District Court granted the motion in part,2 holding that C3WAIN 
“committed fraud against Dunkin’ in the acquisition of the Freehold Mall shop.”  App. 
13.  The District Court then declared the franchise agreement terminated and ordered 
Franchisees to comply with their post-termination obligations under the franchise 
agreement.  Franchisees filed this interlocutory appeal. 
 
 
                                              
 2 In addition to the breach of contract claim, Dunkin’ brought claims for trademark 
infringement, trade dress infringement, and unfair competition, and Franchisees brought a 
counterclaim alleging that the termination of the franchise agreement violated the New 
Jersey Franchise Practices Act (“NJFPA”).  Identical claims were also brought in relation 
to two other Dunkin’ franchises owned by another corporate entity Mr. Ramachandran 
controlled.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Dunkin’ on the 
claims related to the Freehold Mall store.  This appeal is limited to those claims. 
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II3 
 We must decide whether the District Court correctly found that Franchisees 
breached the franchise agreement by committing fraud “relating to a business franchised 
or licensed by [Dunkin’].”  App. 86 ¶ 14.0.4 (franchise agreement).  “To establish a 
breach of contract under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must show that there was a valid 
contract, that the defendant breached its duties under the contractual agreement, and that 
the breach caused the plaintiff damage.”4  Full Spectrum Software, Inc. v. Forte 
Automation Sys., Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 50, 55 (D. Mass. 2015) (internal quotation marks 
                                              
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 1116 and 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1332(a), and 1338.  The District Court ordered C3WAIN to, among other 
things, immediately comply with its post-termination obligations under the franchise 
agreement, which include an obligation to cease the operation of the Dunkin’ Donuts 
store.  This order granted Dunkin’ injunctive relief and we therefore have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) over the orders related to the injunction, namely the 
orders granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and the counterclaim 
regarding the legality of the termination order under the NJFPA.  See Cohen v. Bd. of 
Trs. of the Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2d 1455, 1466 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(holding that an order that can be “immediately enforced” and that “presents serious, 
perhaps irreparable consequences” constitutes injunctive relief under § 1292(a) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Mylan 
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  We apply the same 
standard as the District Court, viewing facts and making all reasonable inferences in the 
non-movant’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  “An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a 
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material 
only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.”  Kaucher v. Cty. of 
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when 
the non-moving party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of her 
case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
4 The franchise agreement is governed by Massachusetts law.     
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and citation omitted).  There is no dispute that the parties had a valid contract.  Dunkin’ 
alleges that the contract was breached because Franchisees committed fraud.  To succeed 
on a claim of fraud under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must show: (1) that a defendant 
made “a false representation of a material fact,” (2) that defendant acted “with knowledge 
of its falsity” and “for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to act thereon,” and (3) “that 
plaintiff relied upon the representation as true and acted upon it to his detriment.”  
FranCounsel Grp., LLC v. Dessange Int’l SA, 980 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D. Mass. 2013) 
(citation omitted); see also Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 772 N.E.2d 1054, 
1066 (Mass. 2002).  Mr. Ramachandran’s representations to Dunkin’ meet all of these 
elements. 
First, a plaintiff may satisfy the “false representation” element by showing either a 
false statement or omission of material information.  In addition, “a party who discloses 
partial information that may be misleading has a duty to reveal all the material facts he 
knows to avoid deceiving the other party.”  V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 757 F.2d 
411, 414 (1st Cir. 1985).  A partial disclosure constitutes a false representation where it 
provides a misleading response to a plaintiff’s inquiry about a material fact.  See id.; see 
also Damon v. Sun Co., 87 F.3d 1467, 1478 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that a false 
representation occurred where defendant told a potential property buyer that the property 
was in good condition and omitted the fact that there had been a 2,000 gallon oil spill on 
the property approximately five years earlier). 
 Mr. Ramachandran’s partial disclosures to Dunkin’ amounted to false 
representations of material facts.  In response to specific questions from Dunkin’ about 
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whether he was developing a Red Mango store in the Mall or had an interest in such a 
store, Mr. Ramachandran repeatedly denied any such involvement, despite the fact that 
he participated in establishing the Red Mango store by engaging in negotiations over its 
lease, personally guaranteeing that lease, and providing the Red Mango store with a 
$150,000 loan.  Moreover, when Dunkin’ asked Mr. Ramachandran “[d]o you own any 
Red Mango stores currently?  You can not be approved to develop a Red Mango with 
Dunkin’ Donuts at the mall,” App. 167, Mr. Ramachandran categorically denied any 
involvement, and went so far as to say that “[t]hey ([R]ed Mango) would be like any 
other store in the mall like a Star Bucks [sic], Gloria Jeans or the local bagel store.  I have 
no financial interest in a Red Mango therefore, it is indeed not a factor to be concerned 
about.”  App. 171.  These responses were misleading partial disclosures since Mr. 
Ramachandran concealed his involvement with the Red Mango store even after Dunkin’ 
expressed concern over any involvement with a Red Mango store.  See Maxwell v. 
Ratcliffe, 254 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Mass. 1969) (stating that once a plaintiff inquired into 
specific facts, “there was special obligation on the [defendants] to avoid half truths and to 
make disclosure at least of any facts known to them or with respect to which they had 
been put on notice”).  In short, even if the District Court found that there is a genuine 
issue of fact as to whether Mr. Ramachandran has a financial interest in the Red Mango 
store,5 there is no question that he partially disclosed his relationship to the Red Mango 
store in a misleading manner. 
                                              
 5 While the District Court noted that disputed issues of fact existed concerning Mr. 
Ramachandran’s financial interest in the Red Mango store and whether the two stores 
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Second, Mr. Ramachandran knew that his partial disclosures conveyed misleading 
statements of material facts and he made them “for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to 
act thereon.”  FranCounsel Grp., LLC, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 6 (citation omitted).  Mr. 
Ramachandran explicitly directed the Mall leasing agent not to tell Dunkin’ about the 
Red Mango store because he did not want Dunkin’ to “cancel” the franchise agreement.  
App. 297.  He thus withheld information with the express purpose of misleading the 
company. 
Finally, Dunkin’s emails to Mr. Ramachandran stating that it would not enter into 
the franchise agreement if he was involved in developing a Red Mango store show that it 
“relied upon the representation [that he was not] as true and acted upon it to [its] 
detriment.”  FranCounsel Grp., LLC, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 6.  Dunkin’ has a policy that “we 
do not permit into the Baskin-Robbins System someone who has an interest in any ice 
cream or frozen treats retail business.  Competition in violation of this principle would 
include . . . Yogurt Concepts.”  App. 164.  Thus, if Dunkin’ determined that Mr. 
Ramachandran had an interest in a retail business with a “Yogurt Concept,” then it would 
                                                                                                                                                  
sold substantially similar products, those disputes are not relevant to determining whether 
Mr. Ramachandran fraudulently misrepresented material facts in violation of the 
franchise agreement.  Those two factual issues go to whether Mr. Ramachandran 
breached the “restrictive covenant” provision, which requires that C3WAIN and its 
shareholders refrain from having “a direct or indirect interest in . . . any business . . . that 
sells products that are the same as or substantially similar to those sold in Dunkin’ 
Donuts or Baskin-Robbins restaurants.”  App. 81.  Before the District Court, Dunkin’ 
argued that Mr. Ramachandran violated this provision and that such violation constituted 
an independent ground to find that C3WAIN breached the contract.  The District Court 
refrained from granting summary judgment on this issue and instead granted summary 
judgment on the breach of contract claim on the basis of the anti-fraud clause.  
Conclusions related to the restrictive covenant thus have no bearing on the breach of the 
anti-fraud provision now under review. 
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not have entered the franchise agreement.  Dunkin’ relied on Mr. Ramachandran’s 
disclosures that he did not have an interest in the Red Mango and thereafter entered into 
the franchise agreement with him.  Dunkin’ had an interest in ensuring its franchisees 
were loyal to its products and it was harmed by granting a franchise to an entity whose 
loyalties were divided.  See Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E. 3d 1242, 1249 (Mass. 
2015) (stating that a requirement for the detrimental reliance element is that the plaintiffs 
“acted upon [the false representation] to their damage” (citation omitted)).  Regardless of 
whether Mr. Ramachandran’s involvement in the Red Mango store amounted to a 
financial interest, Dunkin’s policy and email inquiries demonstrate that his relationship 
with the Red Mango store affected Dunkin’s willingness to enter the franchise agreement 
with him. 
Thus, the District Court correctly concluded that no reasonable jury could find that 
Franchisees did not fraudulently misrepresent Mr. Ramachandran’s involvement in the 
Red Mango store and the Court therefore properly held that such conduct breached the 
franchise agreement.6  See Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).7 
                                              
 6 Franchisees argue that the District Court failed to make specific factual findings 
regarding each of the four elements of the fraud claim.  Regardless of the veracity of this 
claim, on plenary review we “may affirm the district court on any ground supported by 
the record.”  Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 7 The District Court also correctly concluded that the termination did not violate 
the NJFPA.  The Act applies here because C3WAIN was a New Jersey franchisee.  
Liberty Sales Assocs., Inc. v. Dow Corning Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (D.N.J. 1993) 
(citing Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124, 133-35 (N.J. 
1992)).  Despite its applicability, it does not provide a basis for relief.  In relevant part, 
the NJFPA provides that “[i]t shall be a violation of this act for any franchisor . . . to 
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III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order granting summary judgment. 
                                                                                                                                                  
terminate . . . a franchise without having first given written notice setting forth all the 
reasons for such termination.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-5.  Dunkin’ sent written notice to 
Mr. Ramachandran, as the owner of C3WAIN, informing him that he had breached the 
franchise agreement by, among other things, “commit[ing] fraud in connection with your 
franchises by . . . intentionally misrepresenting your involvement with a competing 
business in order to induce Franchisor’s approval of your Freehold Raceway Mall 
Franchise.”  App. 174.  This letter provided adequate notice of the grounds for 
termination by informing C3WAIN that the alleged breach was based on the anti-fraud 
clause of the agreement and that Mr. Ramachandran committed fraud by misrepresenting 
his involvement with a competing business. 
 Franchisees’ argument that the fraud did not constitute a failure to “substantially 
comply” with the agreement sufficient to establish good cause for termination under the 
NJFPA also fails.  The NJFPA provides that “[i]t shall be a violation of this act for a 
franchisor to terminate . . . a franchise without good cause.  For the purposes of this act, 
good cause for terminating . . . a franchise shall be limited to failure by the franchisee to 
substantially comply with those requirements imposed upon him by the franchise.”  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 56:10-5.  “[S]ubstantial compliance—at a minimum—requires that the 
franchisee refrain from acting in direct defiance of a term of the Agreement.”  Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 733, 740 (D.N.J. 2000) 
(concluding that a franchisor had good cause to terminate a franchise agreement where 
franchisee opened a competing store next to the franchise store), aff’d, 263 F.3d 296 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  Dunkin’ terminated the agreement because, among other reasons, C3WAIN 
breached the express contract provision that prohibited fraudulent conduct.  The fraud 
here amounted to “direct defiance of a term of the Agreement.”  Id. 
 Thus, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in Dunkin’s favor on 
Franchisees’ NJFPA counterclaim. 
 
